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Abstract
It is often argued that rigid labour market and centralized bar-
gaining are harmful employment and growth. This paper looks at the
case of Nordic countries as a counter-example pointing to some weak-
nesses of this view. Rigid labour markets, while reducing the offer of
low quality jobs, increase average labor productivity by favoring job
relocation in high quality jobs. Moene and Wallerstein (1997) adopted
a vintage-capital model to compare centralized and decentralized bar-
gaining: they show that centralized bargaining systems yield higher
labor productivity and higher structural unemployment. By intro-
ducing a frictional labor market in the vintage-capital framework ,
we show that the negative effects on employment characterizing cen-
tralized bargaining can be reduced by adopting active labor market
policy.
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1 Introduction
The ‘Nordic’ model provides a way to look at the relation between inequality,
productivity and employment compatible with the social democratic goals of
combining egalitarian distribution of earnings, security of income and effi-
ciency (see Moene 2008). The original formulation of the model is due to
two Swedish trade union economists - Gosta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner- and
dates back to the 40s. Later on, Rehn and Meidner perfected it and advo-
cated its implementation by the Swedish government throughout the 50s and
60s.
Three main policies constituted the core of the model: restrictive fiscal
policy, active labor market policies and wage policy of solidarity. In the con-
text of a small open economy during the post World War II boom, fighting
inflation was a bigger concern than stimulating aggregate demand, which
was kept high by the external channel: fiscal restraint served this purpose.
The two other policies together aimed at fostering structural change while
guaranteeing distributive equality and high employment. Centralized bar-
gaining was at the centre of the system. By negotiating equal remuneration
for identical jobs (‘Equal pay for equal jobs’) regardless of the productivity
of plants or firms, centralized wage bargaining was thought of as a tool ca-
pable not only of providing the equalization of earnings but also of fostering
productivity growth. A more compressed distribution of wages would put
pressure on low productive plant and it would oblige them either to rational-
ize production, thus increasing productivity directly, or to shut down, thus
freeing resources potentially employable by more dynamic and productive
firms or sectors. At the same time, wage compression would act as a subsidy
to investment in more productive plants by increasing their relative value,
and therefore enhancing the scope for job relocation in high-tech activities.
Labor market policies complement wage solidarity as they help the transition
of labor from low to high productive firms, sectors or regions. Labor market
policies could be either universal (matching policies and employment sub-
sidies); or selective (supply-side retraining, vocational education, relocation
grants).
It is a matter of debate whether this model has been faithfully imple-
mented (see Erixon 2008). Centralized wage-setting, however, became a dis-
tinctive feature of Swedish economic policy between 1956 and 1983. Two
different phases can be distinguished. Phase I began in 1956, when national
unions of blue-collar workers (LO) and employers (SAF) found the first com-
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prehensive framework agreement for private blue-collar workers; it lasted till
the late 60s. During this period solidarity wage policy was properly applied
according to the principle ‘equal pay for equal jobs’, and centralized agree-
ments favored wage equalization among analogous jobs in different industries
and plants (Hibbs and Locking 2000, p. 760). In phase II, which began in
the early 70s and ended in 1983 when the last comprehensive agreement was
signed, the main goal of wage solidarity shifted from facilitating structural
change to achieving wage equalization per se, irrespective of the type of job.
As a result, wage inequality was reduced not only across plants and indus-
tries, but also within plants and across skills grade. In fact, during the 70s
both returns to and investment in human capital drastically declined, espe-
cially for university education, thus possibly contributing to a reduction in
productivity growth (Leamer and Lundborg 1997, Lindbeck 1997). Empiri-
cal evidence on the relation between wage dispersion and productivity (Hibbs
and Locking 2000) supports the view that a reduction in ‘across plants’ wage
inequality positively affects labor productivity growth, while a reduction in
‘within plants’ wage inequality—accompanied by an equalization across skill
levels—would be harmful. Such difficulties led to a progressive abandonment
of centralized national bargaining, which after 1983 mostly took place at in-
dustry and firms level. Wage inequality regained ground, but currently it
still stands at levels substantially lower than in Anglo-American economies
(see Pontusson 2006).
A possible formalization of the Rehn-Meidner model has been provided
by Moene and Wallerstein (1997, MW henceforth). They compare the perfo-
mances of centralized and decentralized wage bargaining in terms of produc-
tivity and employment outcomes. They do not, however, take into explicit
consideration the role of labor market policies as originally suggested by Rehn
and Meidner. We adopt the framework proposed by Moene and Wallerstein
and we extend their analysis to consider the relevance of labor market poli-
cies. To the purpose, we will consider a vintage model with frictional un-
employment along the lines of Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2008, HKV
henceforth).
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2 Reminder of the Moene and Wallerstein
model
In this section we provide a simplified reminder of the model developed by
MW (1997). Technical progress occurs at the exogenous rate γ > 0, and
it is embodied in new plants. Since investment costs are sunk there is a
distribution of plants of different ages: plants will be active until they are
productive enough to pay (labor) variable costs. Labor per plant ratio is
fixed and normalized to one. Accordingly, value added per worker of plant
of age t can be represented by
y(t) = y0e
γt. (1)
Relative price of investment (I) to output is assumed constant over time, so
that investment cost follows the same exponential path as value added:
C(I(t)) = C(I(0))eγt. (2)
Profits per worker at time s earned on a plant of age t are given by
pi(s, t) = y(t)− w(s, t), (3)
where w(s, t) is the wage paid on plant of age t at time s. Market value of
a new plant is given by the discounted value of future profits earned on the
plant:
V (t) =
∫ t+ϑ
t
e−ρ(s−t)pi(s, t)ds, (4)
where ρ is the discount rate and ϑ is the expected lifetime of a plant. Free
entry ensures that investment will be pushed to the level where cost and
market value are equal, so that:
V (t) = C(I(t)). (5)
Since plants will be active until they yield non negative profits, the age of
the oldest plant in operation at time s can be obtained by solving:
pi(s, s− ϑ) = y(s− ϑ)− w(s, s− ϑ) = 0. (6)
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Finally, labor supply (normalized to one) constrains investment given the
fixed capital-labor ratio: ∫ s
s−ϑ
I(t)dt ≤ 1. (7)
Focusing on steady states where wages and labor productivity grow at
the same rate γ, equations (5), (6), and (7) determine ϑ, I, and the market
clearing wage rate r(s). Notice that ϑ can be interpreted as an (inverse)
measure of productivity: the longer the optimal lifetime of a plant, the lower
the average productivity.
Within this framework, MW compare the effects of local and centralized
bargaining by adopting two different rules for wage formation. Under lo-
cal bargaining, workers can appropriate a share (a) of their vintage-specific
productivity y(t), so that
w(s, t) = max(ay(t), r(s)). (8)
Under centralized bargaining, workers earn a share of the average productiv-
ity (y¯(s) ≡ (1/ϑ)
∫ s
s−ϑ
y(t)dt):
w(s) = max(ay¯(s), r(s)). (9)
In their analysis, MW show that centralized bargaining is always superior to
local bargaining in terms of steady state productivity while always inferior in
terms of employment; if ay¯(t) > r(s) (the relevant case), centrally bargained
wage is too high to employ the entire labor force, while in the local bargaining
case there is full employment by assumption. The effects on investment
and total output (the product between investment and labor productivity)
will depend on a. At low levels of the workers’ share of productivity the
centralized system turns out to be superior, whereas for a higher than a
certain threshold value local bargaining performs better. This is consistent
with the Swedish experience: in phase II, the observed slowdown in private-
sector employment has been the response to an increase in unions’ wage
claims (Lindbeck 1997).
The rationale underlying these results is that, in order to speed up the
pace of adoption of new plants, centralized wage setting needs to put pressure
on low productive vintage by raising the wage rate above its competitive,
full employment, level. The outcome is a trade-off between productivity and
employment, with the final effect on total production depending on a.
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The model provides a faithful representation of the way solidarity wage
policy was conceived. However, it does not consider the role of labor market
and retraining policies, thus neglecting the other main pillar of the original
view of the Rehn-Meidner model. In the next section we show how the
introduction of a frictional labor market in the MW framework allows gaining
a scope for active labor market policies.1 As it turns out, matching policies
reduce unemployment associated to the centralized wage setting not only by
reducing unemployment duration, but also by increasing employment growth
thanks to a positive effect on the expected value of investment.
3 The model with frictional labor market
Our analysis of capital-embodied productivity growth in the context of a
frictional labor market follows the standard search-vintage approach (Aghion
and Howitt (1994), Mortensen and Pissarides (1998)), recently enriched by
HKV (2008). In particular, as in HKV, firms purchase capital before being
matched to a worker; only after sustaining the investment sunk cost they
engage in the search of workers in the frictional labor market.
3.1 Labor market
Our main point of departure from the standard analysis consists in abandon-
ing the simultaneous determination of labor market tightness and scrapping
age through the job destruction and job creation equations. When central-
ized bargaining is assumed, the exit condition (6) determines the scrapping
age of plant ϑ as the solution to:
y(s− ϑ)− ay¯(s) = 0, (10)
which is implicitly given by a = γϑ/(eγϑ − 1).
Once the age of the oldest active plant is known, our framework will
be able to solve for equilibrium unemployment and the level of investment.
1Note that here frictions are an implicit measure of the degree of heterogeneity in the
labor market. This view is consistent with the modern view of labour market frictions
given by Pissarides (2000). In particular, with respect to the old view that consider
frictional unemployment as the outcome of labour supply decisions, frictions emerge in a
world where workers and firms are heterogeneous and have imperfect information about
the characteristics of their counterpart.
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Plants are productive only when matched to a worker. The meeting process
between firms and workers is governed by the constant returns to scale match-
ing function m(v, u) which gives the number of matches per unit of time as
a function of the number of vacancies (v) and unemployed workers (u). A
firm meets a worker with probability λf = m(v, u)/v. A worker meets a
firm with probability λw = m(v, u)/u, hence 1/λw is the mean duration of
unemployment. Let ζ ≡ v/u, then λf = m(ζ, 1)/ζ, and λw = m(ζ, 1). On
the other hand, existing matches dissolve at the exogenous rate σ.
Steady state equilibrium requires the equality between the flow into and
the flow out of unemployment. Let µ(t) be the measure of employment on
vintage t, so that total employment be µ =
∫ s
s−ϑ
µ(t)dt. Since at age t = ϑ
plants are scrapped, the flow into unemployment is equal to σµ+µ(ϑ); while
the flow out of unemployment is m(ζ, 1)u. Steady state unemployment, in
turn, satisfies:
u
1− u
=
1
m(ζ, 1)
(
σ +
µ(ϑ)
µ
)
(11)
where we used µ = 1− u; and where µ(ϑ)/µ =
[
1− e−(σ+λf )ϑ
]
/[
ϑ− 1
σ+λf
(1− e−(σ+λf )ϑ)
]
(see HKV, p.1099).
3.2 Equilibrium
Taking into account frictions in the labor market and the possibility that
plants be idle, free entry condition (5) need be modified as:
(m(ζ, 1)/ζ)V (t) = C(I(t)). (5 bis)
The system made up of (10), (11) and (5 bis) determines steady state pro-
ductivity (ϑ), unemployment, and investment. Notice that we have dropped
labor market tightness (ζ) from the endogenous variables of the model as it
is determined as a function of u and I: ζ ≡ v/u = (ϑI − (1 − u))/u. The
number of vacancies is equal to the number of existing jobs (ϑI) minus em-
ployment. The assumption of a uniform wage set at a level higher than the
competitive one leads to structural unemployment as the incentive to invest
is not strong enough to yield a number of plants capable of employing the
whole labor force: ϑI − 1 < 0. Were frictions absent from the labor market
(v = 0), we would have u = 1 − ϑI, so that total and structural unemploy-
ment would coincide. On the contrary, a frictional labor market (v > 0),
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implies u > (1 − ϑI): total unemployment consists of the sum of structural
and frictional unemployment.
4 Policy
In a vintage model with frictions, labor market policies can be seen as policies
that favor the relocation of labor from old to new plants. In this context, the
joint effect of centralized wage bargaining and labor market policies might
enhance workers’ relocation towards more productive plants.
In order to investigate this issue, we introduce labor market policies into
the model and we analyze their effect on the steady state values of invest-
ment, employment and productivity. We focus on matching policies, i.e. all
policies which make the meeting between a vacant firm and an unemployed
worker easier. We represent such policies by means of a shift variable in the
matching function. Let z be expenses in labor market policies, the matching
function becomes m(v, u, z), with mz > 0. In particular, in accordance with
several empirical studies (see Pissarides 2000), let us assume a Cobb Douglas
specification of the matching function
m(v, u, z) = g(z)Avαu1−α, (12)
where g′(.) > 0 and g(0) = 1. In turn, we have λf = g(z)A(u/v)
1−α, and
λw = g(z)A(v/u)
α.
Since z does not enter (10), the productivity of the system is unaffected.
In order to assess the effects of a change in z, on u and I, we first normalize (5
bis) dividing by eγt in order to work with stationary variables.2 Our system
becomes {
u
1−u
= λ−1w (σ + p(ϑ, λf ))
λfV = c
, (13)
where p(ϑ, λf) ≡ µ(ϑ)/µ, and c > 0. Contrary to MWwho assume C
′(I(t)) >
0, and in line with the ‘replication argument’ according to which constant
returns to scale should be assumed when all factors of production are variable,
we assume C ′(I(t)) = 0, and C(I(t)) = ceγt.
2Along a balanced growth path both V (t) and C(t) grow at the exogenous rate of
technical change γ.
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Solving the system (see Appendix) we obtain the equilibrium values for
investment and unemployment rate:
I∗ =
1 + V
c
(σ + p(ϑ, c/V ))
ϑ(1 +
(
c
V
) α
1−α (σ + p(ϑ, c/V ))
(
1
g(z)A
) 1
1−α
)
, (14)
u∗ =
(
c
V
) α
1−α (σ + p(ϑ, c/V ))
(
1
g(z)A
) 1
1−α
(
1 +
(
c
V
) α
1−α (σ + p(ϑ, c/V )
)(
1
g(z)A
) 1
1−α
)
. (15)
We are now in the position to state the following:
Proposition 1 an increase in z raises steady state equilibrium level of in-
vestment and lowers steady state equilibrium unemployment rate.
Proof. See Appendix.
The positive effect on employment occurs as the improved matching ef-
ficiency raises the expected profitability and the equilibrium level of invest-
ment. Moreover, since the effect of the investment expansion is larger than
the unemployment reduction, the policy brings about an increase in the num-
ber of vacancies i.e. dv/dz = ϑ(dI∗/dz) + du∗/dz > 0 (see Appendix). In-
tuitively, decreasing returns to ζ in the probability of workers’ matching λw
prevents the increase in the level of investment to fully translate into em-
ployment. As a result of a higher v and a lower u, matching policies also
reduce the average duration of unemployment spells, 1/λw.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper considers the relation between labor market institutions and tech-
nical change moving from the idea that centralized bargaining might favor
job relocation to high tech activities. In particular, by partially isolating
wages from plants productivity, centralized bargaining increases the relative
profitability of more productive with respect to less productive ones. On
the other hand, centralized bargaining fastens the scrapping of old plants
and hence brings about structural unemployment. The negative impact of
centralized bargaining on employment can be mitigated by wage moderation
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or by policies favoring job relocation and retraining. To investigate the lat-
ter issue, we introduce labor market frictions in the benchmark Moene and
Wallerstein model, and we find that relocational policies effectively improves
investment and employment. Overall, our analysis suggests that policy in-
terventions in systems characterized by centralized bargaining are essential
to ensure a good performance in terms of employment.
The effectiveness of the labour market policies, however, depends on its
design and the way it is financed, two issues that are left to future extentions
of this paper. Concerning the former, retraining and active labor market
policies tend to be less effective in periods of fast technological change be-
cause a larger technological distance among successive vintages accelerates
the obsolescence of the specific skills acquired through retraining. As a re-
sult, in periods of fast technological progress, policies favouring job relocation
should be designed so as to enhance the accumulation of general skills that
are more adaptable to innovations (Krueger and Kumar 2004). The issue
of how active labour market policies are financed turns out to be relevant
when the policy is financed through a tax out of profits that would alter the
investment expected profitability. In this case, the distribution of employ-
ment across firms of different age can be deformed by the policy itself, hence
substantially increasing the complexity of our analysis.
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A Appendix I
Let us start with the system:{
u
1−u
= λ−1w (σ + p(ϑ, λf ))
λfV = c
.
From the second equation we have λf = c/V , so that we can re-write the
system as
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{
u
1−u
= 1
g(z)A
(u/v)α (σ + p(ϑ, c/V ))
g(z)A(u/v)1−αV = c
.
From the second equation we have u/v = (c/(g(z)AV ))
1
1−α = δ (1/g(z)A)
1
1−α ,
where δ ≡ (c/V )
1
1−α , hence u/1−u = δα
(
1
g(z)A
) 1
1−α
(σ+p(ϑ)). Using the defi-
nition v = ϑI−(1−u) in u/v to solve for u, we get u = δ (1/ (g(z)A))
1
1−α ·(ϑI−
(1−u)), whence u = δ (1/ (g(z)A))
1
1−α (ϑI−1)/
(
1− δ (1/ (g(z)A))
1
1−α
)
, 1−
u =
(
1− δϑI
(
1
g(z)A
) 1
1−α
)
/
(
1− δ
(
1
g(z)A
) 1
1−α
)
and u/1−u = δ
(
1
g(z)A
) 1
1−α
(ϑI−
1)/
(
1− δϑI
(
1
g(z)A
) 1
1−α
)
. Equating the two expressions for u/(1−u) solves
for the equilibrium value of investment: δ(ϑI∗−1)/
(
1− δϑI∗
(
1
g(z)A
) 1
1−α
)
=
δα(σ + p(ϑ)).
Hence,
I∗ =
1 + δα−1(σ + p(ϑ))
ϑ
[
1 + δα(σ + p(ϑ))
(
1
g(z)A
) 1
1−α
] .
In order to assess the effect of a change in labor market policies expenses
on investment we differentiate investement with respect to z:
∂
∂z

 1 + δ
α−1(σ + p(ϑ))
ϑ
[
1 + δα(σ + p(ϑ))
(
1
g(z)A
) 1
1−α
]

 = δ
α (p(ϑ) + σ) · g′z
(
1
Ag(z)
) α
1−α [
(p(ϑ) + σ) δα−1 + 1
]
ϑ (1− α) · Ag(z)2
[
1 + δα(σ + p(ϑ))
(
1
g(z)A
) 1
1−α
]2 > 0.
Plugging I∗ into u = δ
(
1
g(z)A
) 1
1−α
(ϑI − 1)/
(
1− δ
(
1
g(z)A
) 1
1−α
)
, we ob-
tain the equilibrium value of unemployment u∗ =
δ( 1g(z)A)
1
1−α

ϑ(1+δ
α−1(σ+p(ϑ)))( 1g(z)A)
1
1−α
ϑ(1+δα(σ+p(ϑ)) 1
g(z)A
1
1−α )
−1


1−δ( 1g(z)A)
1
1−α
=
δ( 1g(z)A)
1
1−α
[
δα−1(σ+p(ϑ))−δα(σ+p(ϑ))( 1g(z)A)
1
1−α
]
[
1+δα
(
σ+p(ϑ))( 1g(z)A)
1
1−α
)(
1−δ( 1g(z)A)
1
1−α
)] = δα(σ+p(ϑ))( 1g(z)A)
1
1−α
(1+δα(σ+p(ϑ))( 1g(z)A)
1
1−α )
.
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Differentiating unemployment with respect to z:
∂
∂z

 δ
α(σ + p(ϑ))
(
1
g(z)A
) 1
1−α
(1 + δα(σ + p(ϑ))
(
1
g(z)A
) 1
1−α
)

 = − δ
α (σ + p(ϑ)) g′z ·
(
1
g(z)A
) α
1−α
(1− α) · Ag(z)2
[
1 + δα(σ + p(ϑ))
(
1
g(z)A
) 1
1−α
]2 < 0.
Substituting δ ≡ (c/V )
1
1−α in the expression for I∗, and u∗ gives the values
in the text.
Finally, the change in the number of vacancies is:
∂v/∂z = ϑ(∂I∗/∂z) + ∂u∗/∂z =
δ2α−1(p(ϑ)+σ)2·g′z( 1Ag(z))
α
1−α
(1−α)·Ag(z)2
[
1+δα(σ+p(ϑ))( 1g(z)A)
1
1−α
]2 > 0.
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